A ‘voting system’ is a set of machines, procedures, and materials that collectively encompass a complete means with which to record votes and tally results for an election.
Alamance County uses a custom build of ES&S Voting System 5.2.4.0, the second-most current North Carolina certified system from election machine vendor Election Systems & Software.
It is worth noting that the general version 5.2.4.0 of this system, as defined on ES&S’ website and publicly available documentation (i.e. what one would find by googling these terms), encompasses more devices than are actually certified for use in North Carolina, and more than are used in Alamance County.
Which specific devices from this system are certified in North Carolina can be found on the State Board of Elections’ website, and which are in use here in Alamance County can be found here. Any other source of information regarding these voting systems, including general information from the manufacturer’s website, can easily confuse a layman by mentioning systems and features of systems not in use in North Carolina.
Alamance County uses a setup consisting of DS200 Precinct Tabulators for tabulating precinct and Early Voting results, the DS850 Central Count Tabulator for tabulating Absentee by Mail and Provisional results, and the ExpressVote Ballot Marking Device for ballot generation during Early Voting as well as an ADA-compliant ballot generation option on Election Day.
Results are only tabulated and generated by the two tabulators. The ExpressVote is a ballot marking device, which takes a blank card and prints a voter’s selections on it to be fed into a tabulator, and does not record any results. Results are retrieved from each tabulation device on Election Night and aggregated to generate results totals, which are then sent to the state to be displayed publicly.
DS200 Tabulators tabulate the majority of votes in Alamance County. A DS200 Tabulator takes into its scanner either a full-face paper ballot or an ExpressVote paper ballot, reads it, and depending on what is on the ballot it either counts it and drops it into its attached bin, or *denotes any mistakes on the ballot *and* either offers the opportunity to get the ballot back* in order to correct any correctable mistakes, or* simply spits the ballot back out if the mistake cannot be corrected*.
There is always one DS200 Tabulator at each physical location in Alamance County individuals go to vote on Election Day and at each Early Voting site. Any ballot not passed into the DS200 Tabulator and a physical voting location that is not a provisional ballot or absentee by mail ballot will not be a part of the results, so it is important to never leave a polling place with your ballot. Leaving a polling place with your ballot is also illegal (N.C.G.S 163-273(a)(2)).
The ExpressVote Ballot Marking Device serves as an ADA accessible option for visually impaired voters, or any voters with a disability that can lead to difficulties filling out a ballot with a pen and paper, on Election Day. At Early Voting sites, the ExpressVote is used for all voters.
The process for using the ExpressVote is as follows:
- A voter feeds a blank sheet of ballot paper into the ExpressVote
- The voter makes contest selections on the ExpressVote’s touch screen
- After the voter has made all their desired selections, they signal the machine to print their ballot
- The ExpressVote creates a ballot for them, already filled with their selections
- The voter then moves to the DS200 Tabulator, and runs their ballot through that machine to cast their vote
The DS850 Central Count Tabulator is a high-speed tabulator housed at secure Board of Elections central locations. This machine is used to tabulate all absentee by mail ballots and any provisional ballots that are accepted after Election Day.
The main difference between this tabulator and the more numerous DS200s is that the DS850 is always used for live voting in the presence of a quorum of Board of Elections members, and is managed and operated directly by (or under the direct supervision of) full-time, specially trained professionals rather than poll workers.
With this machine, ballots are stacked on a feed tray to be run, then run at high speed and deposited into trays based on ballot disposition. Results from this machine are also read in to be aggregated with other results on Election Night.
To read more about some of how ballots are handled during this process, see question and “Can voting machines correctly detect write-in votes? If so, how do the machines count these votes?” and questions related to ballot mistakes in the ‘Absentee by Mail Voting’ and ‘General Voting Questions sections.
If by ‘counted by hand’ one refers to a process wherein a ballot is visually examined by a human being, the votes seen are recorded on paper or manually typed into a computer, and those votes are added to the official totals without ever running through a tabulation machine, the answer is no, unless there is reliable cause found to doubt machine results (G.S. 163-182.2 (a)(6)).
All valid ballots, even Absentee by Mail and Provisional ballots, are eventually run through a machine for the official count. If a ballot never passes through a machine (specifically a tabulator, not the ExpressVote Ballot Marking Device), the votes on that ballot are not part of the results unless a full hand-eye recount of all results is ordered and subsequently deemed more accurate.
This is why provisional ballots that are determined to be valid are run through a machine rather than just being tallied up, and why damaged ballots returned through Absentee by Mail are duplicated rather than tallied up (for more on ballot duplication, see the Absentee by Mail Voting section). A machine count must be produced and relied upon if a certified voting system is being utilized in a particular county absent any major inaccuracies or valid protests resulting in further investigation.
Machines are tested for functional mistakes prior to an Election and sealed to prevent any access before use. Machines are incapable of deciding, of their own accord, to modify vote totals for malicious purposes, whereas a human being can never be guaranteed to produce no mistakes in counting and is capable of hiding malicious intent. Therefore, aside from write-in votes (which still must be registered by a machine as being a write-in vote), any manual human tallying of votes as an initial means of determining results is near-universally discouraged for jurisdictions over 1,000 voters.
As a helpful metaphor, this is the same reason why most of the duration of a commercial airliner flight is through autopilot. Only a handful of major air disasters have ever been tenuously connected to software malfunction, whereas tens of thousands have resulted from human error. In flight as well as in vote tabulation, it makes the most statistical and practical sense to cut as much potential for human error out of standard procedure as possible, saving hand counts for sample-based accuracy checks.
Ballots with write-in votes are all still run through a voting machine. North Carolina voting machines can detect the presence of a write-in vote using the bubble next to the line where the name is written in. However, they cannot and do not attempt to tally those write-in votes based on interpretation of human handwriting.
Handwriting translation software and systems have gotten much better since their inception but are still not accurate enough to be used to correctly deduce voter intent from any individual’s handwriting. As such, when a write-in occurs on a ballot, the machine just counts it internally as a generic write-in without attempting to read what name is written in.
After the election, the write-in votes are tallied the only way they can be, by hand. An image of each write-in vote can be saved, and can be printed from the machine as well at poll close, which is two ways those votes can be collected for hand tally (specific method used is a county to county choice, Alamance County does both to make sure nothing was missed).
Note that tallied write-in results must still match the total number of machine recorded write-in votes in order for the process to be complete. For example, if the machines recorded 346 write-in votes in an election and those tallying votes by hand came up with 300 votes for Jeffrey Higgenbothum and 48 for Jennifer Jospeth it would have to be determined why there were two more votes tallied than were recorded as existing.
Only write-in votes for candidates who have qualified as such through petition are added to said candidate’s totals by default. Write-ins of people who are not a qualified write-in candidate are simply denoted as being for an unqualified candidate in records and not counted for anyone.
The only exception to the above is in nonpartisan contests and municipal contests. In those contests, if write-ins are permitted, all written-in names are tallied and treated as actual contenders in the contest, however, only write-in candidates that reach a certain threshold of votes (that varies based on a number of factors) are included in the final, official results.
A totals tape is a results tape from a tabulation machine printed after a tabulator is done being used for live voting (i.e. when the polls are closed). This tape has the results from that particular machine printed on it.
While results totals reported are not manually read off of a totals tape and entered by hand into the aggregation software, they are still important. These tapes provide a means for comparison against totals collected on Election Night in the aggregation software, which is part of a larger comparison of total number of ballots recorded by the machine to counts of ATV forms and voted ballots at the precinct.
Zero tapes are totals tapes printed prior to machine use for live voting where all totals are intended to evaluate to zero. Before any instance of a tabulator being used for live voting in North Carolina, it is legally required to print the results on the machine, which should all be zero, signaling that the machine is cleared of any results (08 NCAC 04 .0304(a)).
In between elections in Alamance County, voting machines are under multiple levels of redundant security measures preventing physical access to their storage locations, including video surveillance.
Regular yearly maintenance is performed by vendors to verify that machines are functioning properly (mechanically and technically), and prior to each Election county Elections staff performs Logic and Accuracy (L&A) testing on all machines to be used for live voting to test the machines logically.
During L&A testing, test decks fitting certain specifications are run through all machines to be used for live voting, and ballot marking devices are verified to contain and print all necessary selections. Results are then printed from the tabulators and read in for aggregation just like in a real election.
Results from the printed tapes are compared to totals read in for aggregation, which are both compared to the totals that the test decks were designed to add up to. If the totals match across all three places, the machines are certified to be used in the upcoming Election.
The communication between the counties and state is also tested during an event called the ‘Mock Election’, where L&A test results are sent to a state level just like on Election Night. This also provides the final piece of true ‘End to End’ logic and accuracy testing. If there is a discrepancy anywhere in this process, the origin of the discrepancy is rooted out and the process is repeated until all results match ‘End to End’.
This means that once the Mock Election is complete, the results are ensured to have been correctly read by machines, printed on tapes, loaded into the central system for aggregation, and reported to the state. This process in its entirety is identical to live voting results collection, and offers more than reasonable assurance of accuracy in conjunction with proper chain of custody procedures.
Once the Mock Election has been completed and the machines are certified, they are all sealed with tamper-proof seals until the moment they are used for live voting. These seals are designed such that they cannot be removed without damaging them, and are placed on machines such that it is impossible to access the machine without removing the seals.
If there is a window of time between when the machines are tested and the Mock Election (as there often is), the machines are sealed during this period of time as well, and any subsequent discrepancy in results displayed at a State level during the Mock Election is addressed before certification is finalized.
The seals placed post-certification remain during transport to the devices’ individual polling locations, with the addition of other physical security measures and separate chain of custody practices for transportation personnel, when said personnel differ from those primarily responsible for the machines’ security.
On Election Day or on the first day of Early Voting, these seals are all checked by on-site staff (Judges on Election Day or Site Coordinators for Early Voting) against what was recorded at the time of their sealing. Any seal difference or absence that cannot be explained results in a machine being subbed out for a tested and certified backup machine out of an abundance of caution.
During live voting, if machines at polling places and Early Voting sites have been determined to be secure (i.e. the seals are determined to be those that were attached when the machines were transported), these machines have all sensitive areas secured with more tamper-proof seals during the actual voting process. Any seal attached is recorded, and any seal removed is checked.
Early Voting machines remain at their site throughout the duration of Early Voting, and are sealed and locked into their site each night until voting resumes the next day. Each morning, seals from the night before are checked, and any unexplained absence or difference results in machine replacement.
A simple way to explain this and prior described transportation processes is that any time after L&A Testing, the machines are locked and sealed with recorded tamper-proof seals, with the locations of the seals contingent upon whether or not the machine is in active use. This practice remains in place until after the machines’ final return home post-election.
Core proof of voting machines not being tampered with during the elections process mostly comes from paper ballot record-based auditing and verification of totals post-election. After each election, the paper ballots containing voters’ actual votes are retained for a minimum of 22 months, so that any discrepancies have adequate time to be discovered and, if necessary, a full hand-eye recount can be conducted. In special cases, this minimum can be extended by court order and many county offices keep physical records for much longer than the minimum time frame.
On Election Night, totals from each individual precinct machine as well as totals from Early Voting machines and the DS850 Central Count Tabulator are read in to be aggregated. These totals are immediately compared individually to their corresponding paper tapes, just like during L&A Testing.
These totals are also compared against known numbers of issued ballots from Early Voting and Absentee by Mail, and ATV (Authorization to Vote) form numbers from each precinct polling place, respectively, and are later also reconciled with unused ballots returned post-Election by staff. This is to ensure that each county has the same number of people recorded as having voted as they have ballots recorded as having passed through machines, because those two counts are kept separate to maintain vote secrecy.
Also, in the days immediately after each election something called the ‘Sample Audit’ is performed. During this audit, two precinct groupings of results are randomly selected at the state level to have all their paper ballots from each voting method source pulled and counted by hand, then compared against the results the machines generated. This process provides a crucial element of unpredictability that would be logically crippling for anyone attempting to interfere with machine behavior ahead of the Election.
There are plenty of opportunities for the public to engage with this process in each county, from attending L&A Testing prior to an election and attending public Board of Elections meetings to opening a dialogue directly with local elections offices.
Elections administration is a deceptively complicated field both legally and procedurally that is poorly understood by the general population. We always welcome questions regarding the process through telephone/in person during business hours (Mon. to Fri. 8am-5pm) and by email. For our contact information, scroll to the bottom of any page on this website.
In addition, the State Board of Elections offers a wealth of information on their website regarding voting equipment and vote tabulation.
However, it should be noted that the average North Carolina citizen (outside of the positions mentioned below) is entitled to information by law on the level of access, not oversight. There is no law permitting outside arbitrary auditing by members of the public or examination of any data, information, or aspect of the process not considered public record (for a more precise definition of what is and is not permitted, explore this section and the section on Records and Data).
One is only granted levels of oversight in career Election Administration positions, as a poll worker, or as an official party-appointed Observer or Board Member, with the level of oversight varying widely between these positions.
Action outside of the legal responsibilities of these positions has the potential to be punished in a variety of ways, and there is plenty of legal precedent for such.
You may request a copy of both, though circumstances vary for each.
With a zero tape, you may NOT create any copy or request one until after Election Day. The zero tape must remain in the custody of and secured by election officials throughout the voting process. Party-appointed observers may view it at the polling place while observing the process but the means by which this viewing occurs is entirely up to the Chief Judge (or Site Coordinators at Early Voting).
Any action perceived as impeding or interfering with the process may be answered with removal from the voting enclosure, but generally (and by law, in the case of party-appointed Observers) ample warnings are provided before this is necessary. However, it should be noted that if a dispute over rights to monitor any part of the process ever takes a threatening or violent tone, poll workers are instructed to not hesitate to involve law enforcement.
With a totals tape, you may request a copy as soon as it is available, although when that copy is provided is entirely up to the Chief Judge or office staff, depending on where it is requested. Often a copy is posted physically at the polling place itself, and Chief Judges/Judges can print an extra copy if one is not posted by default. A picture can be taken of that copy as well, but NOT of any accompanying closing procedures.
Note that on-site totals tapes restrictions and procedures do not apply to Early Voting sites. Tabulators used at Early Voting sites are not actually closed until Election Day, so no Early Voting totals tapes even exist until then. Early Voting daily reconciliation procedures are performed by comparing ballots cast to ATV forms rather than votes, because it is illegal to acquire results from those machines prior to Election Day.
Finally, ExpressVote Ballot Marking Devices do not record results, therefore they do not (and cannot) provide any tapes. Any request for a copy of ExpressVote tapes will be met with confusion, as no such tapes exist.
Legal references for this section: N.C.G.S. 163-182.2(a)(3); 08 NCAC 04 .0304(a); 08 NCAC 10B .0105(h)
The public is (and party appointed Observers are) prohibited from recording machine opening and closing procedures. Any recording taken within a voting enclosure must be by media approved by the Chief Judge/Site Coordinator (or pre-approved by office staff if outside of live voting) and must consist solely of general panoramic shots. If any voters are present during media recording, said voters’ individual permissions must also be obtained in order to film anything.
For legal references, see question “Can I request a copy of a machine zero or totals tape, or create one myself through a photograph?”.
L&A Testing is also not permitted to be recorded by policy in Alamance County, but attendance by request or during open testing periods is permitted, and encouraged. For more information on L&A Testing and when it is conducted, contact our office at the number listed in our contact information.
Board of Elections meetings are already recorded by Board of Elections staff, and are all available on our Youtube channel going back to October 2020. Members of the public present for a Board of Elections meeting will not be permitted to make their own recordings.
